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Abstract. The choice of the consensus method ultimately determines throughput, scalabil-
ity, tamper resistance, and consistency of a blockchain system. However, across all the types
of blockchain (private, semi-private, consortium, or public), there is no consensus method that
uniformly addresses all these traits. Verifiable lottery algorithms (Proof of ...) increase tamper re-
sistance but show weakness in throughput and scalability, while established methods like PAXOS
and RAFT provide no additional protection against tampering. In this paper, we introduce Right
to Sign which aims to provide additional tamper resistance by cryptographic signatures over a
broad range of available consensus finding methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
The publication of the seminal paper on Bitcoin
[1] has sparked an ongoing global interest in cryp-
tocurrencies and the underlying blockchain technol-
ogy. Recent developments like Ethereum [2] and Hy-
perledger [3] aim for making blockchain technology
availabe to a broader range of applications that re-
quire data immutability and tamper resistance, e.g.
medical records, track & trace in supply chains, or
identity & access management. But like other dis-
tributed database systems, blockchains suffer from
the limited scalability of finding distributed consensus
on who is allowed to write data [4], which is impera-
tive to keep data consistent [5, 6].
II. BLOCKCHAIN
A. Definition of blockchain
We define a blockchain as a sequence of data con-
tainers called blocks B0, B1, . . . , Bn. B0 is called the
genesis block. Each block can be identified by its
hash, which is the hash value of some or all data in the
block. Furthermore, a block contains at least a block
number that satisfies the clock consistency condition,
and the hash of the previous block.
FIG. 1. A simple blockchain.
The blocks are then chained together by refer-
encing their immediate predecessor hash, hence the
name blockchain, as shown in Figure 1.
B. Data immutability
Data stored in a blockchain is considered to be im-
mutable. To achieve immutability, a blockchain fol-
lows these basic principles:
1. Blocks are only appended at the end of the chain.
2. There has to be consensus on who is allowed to
append the next block to the chain in order to
avoid race conditions.
3. Data already written is never changed. There is
no UPDATE or DELETE.
4. The hash of the previous block must be included
in the current block.
The integrity of every block, and hence the whole
chain, can thus be verified by comparing its hash to
the predecessor hash of the following block.
However, such a blockchain still can be changed if
all block hashes from a changed block onwards can
be rehashed with feasible effort. Therefore, additional
safeguards are applied:
• Copies of the blockchain are stored in multiple
locations.
• The hash function to obtain a block hash is de-
liberately made computationally expensive.
• Additional attestation mechanisms, like digital
signatures, can be used to further secure the
block hashes.
C. Tasks and nodes
Following the principles given in II B, some basic
tasks can be identified which must be fulfilled in a
working blockchain system.
Tasks are delegated to specialized nodes in order to
achieve horizontal scalability and fault tolerance.
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2Task Purpose
Append Create a new block and
append it to the chain with
consensus of the whole
blockchain system
Attest Attest that there truly was
consensus of the whole
blockchain system at the
time the block was added
TABLE I. Basic tasks in a blockchain system
III. FINDING CONSENSUS
As already shown, there has to be consensus among
all nodes on who is allowed to append the next block to
the chain to avoid race conditions and potential data
corruption. While concurrent reads can happen any-
where and anytime, as shown in Figure 2, Figure 3
shows how concurrent writes must be serialized and
must happen only at the end of the chain.
FIG. 2. Concurrent reads in a Blockchain
FIG. 3. Serialized writes on a Blockchain
As this is a common problem for all distributed
database systems [5], of which blockchain systems
are one representative, diverse consensus finding al-
gorithms for distributed systems have been, and are
being, developed [7].
A. Deterministic consensus
In deterministic consensus algorithms, the leading
node is chosen out of all participating nodes by a de-
terministic schedule. One example is the Round Robin
method, where a node is selected by iterating over a
set of 1 . . . n nodes. For a Round-Robin schedule with
1 . . . n nodes, p = 1n if all nodes participate in every
scheduling iteration.
A special case is the single node, where consensus
is established simply by the lack of alternatives. For a
single node, the probability p to append the next block
is obviously p = 1.
B. Voting consensus
Voting consensus algorithms use elections to deter-
mine the leading node. This node is then the leader for
the duration of an election term. Depending on the al-
gorithm, the duration of an election term telection can
be good for one action only, a fixed period of time, a
random period of time or as long as this node does
not fail. Voting consensus algorithms typically require
comparatively extensive communication between the
participating nodes, which means sending messages
over some kind of network. RAFT [8] is a typical ex-
ample. There is an excellent interactive explanation of
RAFT that shows the amount of communication neces-
sary to find consensus [15].
When sending messages over a network, there is
usually no direct control over the latency of the net-
work tnetwork since this is subject to factors like over-
all network utilization, network failures, or malicious
attacks. The probability of being elected as a lead-
ing node to append the next block is at least partially
determined by two non-deterministic factors:
p = P (telection, tnetwork)
C. Proof of work consensus
Proof of work was broadly introduced by [1]. Unlike
other consensus algorithms, it requires minimal net-
work communication. The core idea is that any node
can declare itself to be the leader and present a proof
for this claim. This proof is then checked by every
node and accepted or refused.
The original proof of work needs to iteratively find
a nonce that, hashed together with the data in the
block, produces a hash value which satisfies a global
constraint, called difficulty d. This is computationally
expensive, since there is no known way to find such a
hash other than repeatedly hashing the data of the
block and increment the nonce with each iteration.
This hash is the block hash.
The validity of a block can be checked by all partici-
pating nodes by hashing the data and the nonce of the
3block once, and comparing the obtained hash value to
d. This is an computationally cheap operation, com-
pared to finding a block hash satisfying d as described
above.
So, proof of work uses a lottery mechanism where
each node draws his own "‘lucky numbers"’ to find a
valid block hash. If one is found, it is then commu-
nicated to all other nodes who in turn can verify the
validity of the claim ex post, and then decide to either
accept or refuse it.
The time period T (r) for a node with hardware ca-
pable of performing r hash operations per second to
find a valid block is distributed exponentially with the
rate rd
P {T (r) ≤ t} = 1− e− rd ·t
For n nodes with hash rates r1, r2, . . . , rn the period
of time T to find a valid block hash then equals the
minimum value of random variables T (ri) if the node
publishes a valid block and there is zero network la-
tency. T is then distributed exponentially also
P {T = Ti} = rin∑
j=1
rj
This means any node with a share of compute power s
has the probability p = s to find a valid block hash.
IV. THE LORELEIEAN BEAUTY OF PROOF OF WORK
CONSENSUS FINDING
The beauty of proof of work is twofold. Unlike other
consensus finding methods with changing leaders pre-
sented in this paper, proof of work minimizes net-
work traffic during the election phase. Since every
node can work on the Proof without communicating
to others, network communication is only necessary
for sending new blocks to the nodes and verification
of the Proof, once a block shall be appended. Also,
proof of work also allows all nodes to verify ex post
that an node really found the Proof by checking the
block hash against the nonce and the difficulty d. So
it is also self-attesting.
1 {"block_number": 1,
2 "difficulty": 45323,
3 "nonce": 42,
4 "previous_block_hash": "2D711642B726B04401627CA9
FBAC32F5C8530FB1903CC4DB02258717921A4881"}
FIG. 4. Proof of work block header
Figure 4 shows a block header containing suffcient
metadata to check for consensus and attestation of
consensus by proof of work.
A. Power consumption
The main disadvantage of proof of work is, that is re-
quires comparatively high compute resources to find
the Proof. Current estimates for Bitcoin show, that it
consumes 67 TW/h, or generates 32 kt of CO2, as of
May 2018 [9]. One could say, that large scale proof
of work is a ecological disaster. Proof of work is also
prone to race conditions if more than one node finds
the Proof simultaneously. In case of Bitcoin, race
conditions frequently lead to different copies of the
blockchain which then have to merged back into one
common one. Clients see already committed transac-
tions disappear which have to be re-issued in order to
not getting lost.
B. Attacks against proof of work
Proof of work is also susceptible to attacks where
one or a coordinated group of participants accumu-
lates at least 51% of the total compute power. In this
case, the attacker may deny attestation of other par-
ticipant’s transactions in favor of his own. Such at-
tacks have been described in [1] and are actually ex-
ecuted against cryptocurrencies with a comparatively
low number of participants [11].
V. ATTESTATION IN NON PROOF OF WORK BASED
BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEMS
As shown before, proof of work combines consensus
finding for the append and attest tasks in a blockchain
system. If another consensus finding method is used,
e.g. to mitigate the issues with proof of work, ad-
ditional attestation must occur. A long-standing and
proven method used for attestation are digital signa-
tures [10].
FIG. 5. A blockchain with attestation by digital signatures
Figure 6 shows a simplified block header containing
sufficient metadata to check for attestation of consen-
sus by means of a digital signature.
A. Digital signatures
A digital signature is built by generating the hash
value of some data, usually called a fingerprint F . The
41 {"block_number": 1,
2 "certificate": "cmV0ZXRyZXdheGMgZmc0NDU1NjU2ZzY3
ODY1NDN0cmVncmV6NTQ3aXRoam1oICB0ZXRlenJleg==",
3 "previous_block_hash": "2D711642B726B04401627CA9
FBAC32F5C8530FB1903CC4DB02258717921A4881",
4 "signature": "A1FCE4363854FF888CFF4B8E7875D600C268
2390412A8CF79B37D0B11148B0FA"}
FIG. 6. Header of a digitally signed block
fingerprint is then encrypted with the secret key of the
owner of this data which gives the signature S.
hash(data)→ Fowner; encrypt(Fowner)→ S
This signature can be checked by any interested party
by building F again from the data received, decrypt-
ing the signature with the public key of the owner of
this data and finally comparing both fingerprints. If
they are not equal, the data has been changed after
the signature was generated.
hash(data)→ Frecipient; decrypt(S)→ Fowner;
check : Fowner = Frecipient
B. Trust in digital signatures
To forge a digital signature, an attacker would ei-
ther have to find some alternative data that gives the
same fingerprint, or generate a new signature. Be-
cause cryptographic hashing algorithms have very low
collision probabilities and because of the asymmetric
nature of public-key cryptography where the public
key can only be used to encrypt and the private key
only to decrypt or vice versa, both attack scenarios are
very unlikely. However, if the veracity of the owner’s
public key cannot be verified, any party checking the
digital signature cannot be sure that the signature
was truly built by the legitimate owner of the data. A
well established means to provide such trust in iden-
tity without personally knowing the issuer of a digital
signature are certificates.
A certificate is the public key of some entity (a per-
son, a machine etc.) bundled together with other in-
formation about that entity, like name or address, that
was itself digitally signed by a trusted third party,
called a certificate authority (CA) to certify that it is
genuine and bound to aforementioned entity.
The most widely used standard for certificates is de-
fined by the ITU Telecommunication Standardization
Sector of the International Telecommunication Union
in recommendation X.509 [12], e.g. for SSL and TLS
network transport encryption.
VI. INTRODUCING RIGHT TO SIGN
Right to Sign separates the duties of finding consen-
sus and attestation of consensus. Consensus is found
either by an external consensus mechanism or proof
of work. The attestation is always done by digital sig-
natures.
To make this possible, we introduce a hybrid block
header as shown in Figure 7.
1 {"block_number": 1,
2 "difficulty": 45323,
3 "certificate": "cmV0ZXRyZXdheGMgZmc0NDU1NjU2ZzY3
ODY1NDN0cmVncmV6NTQ3aXRoam1oICB0ZXRlenJleg==",
4 "previous_block_hash": "2D711642B726B04401627CA9
FBAC32F5C8530FB1903CC4DB02258717921A4881",
5 "signature": "A1FCE4363854FF888CFF4B8E7875D600C268
2390412A8CF79B37D0B11148B0FA"}
FIG. 7. A hybrid block header
It contains sufficient metadata to operate the
blockchain in two modes of consensus finding, exter-
nal or proof of work.
If global difficulty is set to zero, consensus must be
found by an external method. The attestation is done
by storing a certificate signed by a CA in the block
and signing the blockhash with the private key of that
certificate.
receive new block request
get new block number
global-difficulty > 0 ?
true false
while block-difficulty <
global-difficulty
make self-signed certificate
add certificate to block
header
calculate blockhash
calculate block-difficulty
from blockhash
load private-key
and CA-signed
certificate
add certificate
to block header
calculate
blockhash
∅
sign blockhash with private-key
emit signed block
FIG. 8. The Right to Sign algorithm
If global difficulty is greater than zero, consensus
is found by repeated generation of a self-signed cer-
tificate, storing that certificate in the block, and mak-
ing the blockhash until the block difficulty is equal or
5greater than the global difficulty. Attestation is then
done by signing the blockhash with the private key of
the generated self-signed certificate.
Figure 8 describes Right to Sign in Nassi-
Shneiderman notation. Concomitant proof-of-concept
Python [13] code was released [14].
Since attestation is now independent of the con-
sensus finding method even mixing methods becomes
possible. Right to Sign allows to build blockchain sys-
tems where a change of the consensus method does
not force a change in the data structure of the blocks.
A. Attacks against Right to Sign
In proof of work mode, Right to Sign is vulnerable to
51% attacks as described in IV B like any other proof
of work like method. For the case of Sybil attacks
[16], proof of work inhibits them through the amount
of compute resources needed. However, when using
node bound certificates, an attacker could try a Sybil
attack by adding rogue nodes to the system. But such
nodes would have to bring their own certificates so
that such an attack could be detected and stopped
by rejecting new blocks signed with unknown certifi-
cates. If the list of allowed certificates is known to
all regular nodes, any unknown certificate can be de-
tected in O(1) time.
VII. CONCLUSION
By decoupling the tasks of consensus and attes-
tation, where attestation is always accomplished us-
ing digital signatures, Right to Sign allows to choose
from a wide range of consensus methods, from fixed
leader to proof of work. Together with the accom-
panying universal block header, this allows to build
blockchain systems where a change of the consensus
method does not force a change in the data structure
of the blocks. We see this as a thought-provoking im-
pulse towards decoupling data from protocol in future
blockchain systems, aiming for better interoperability
and scalability.
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